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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
MICHAEL NORTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020109-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a judgment and conviction for two counts of acting as a Bail Bond 
Recovery Agent, without a proper license, under Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-107 (1998) and § 53-11-
124 (1998), class A misdemeanors, two counts of Unlawful Detention, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
304 (Supp. 2001), class B misdemeanors, and Assault, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 
2000), a class B misdemeanor, in the First Judicial District Court, Cache County, the Honorable Clint 
S. Judkins presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court create an unconstitutional "strict liability" offense negating the State's 
burden of proving the mens rea element of the offense of Acting as a Bail Bond Recovery Agent or 
Apprentice without a license, under Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-107 (1998)? 
Standard of Review: The Standard of review of this issue is difficult because the issue of 
whether this was a "strict liability" offense is being raised for the first time on appeal. "With limited 
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exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first 
time on appeal." Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. Of Edu.. 797 P.2d 412,413 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). Defendant claims that this issue was preserved by the 
argument at Defendant's Motion in Limine, on March 30,2001. If defendant is appealing from that 
ruling, then the issue is whether the trial properly ruled that defendant was not entitled to assert a 
mistake of law defense. 
2. Did the trial court properly rule that defendant was not entitled to raise a mistake of law as 
a defense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-3 04(2)(b) (1974), based on the facts of this case? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness with a "measure of 
discretion" given to the trial court's application of the legal standard to the fact. State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114,1116 (Utah App. 1997). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not allowing defendant to retake the witness stand 
to testify about issues that the trial court had ruled were inadmissible, when defendant had already 
given testimony concerning those matters. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of admissibility or relevancy of testimony 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. ex rel. A.D.. 6 p.3d 1137,1138 (Utah App. 
2000). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are contained in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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Defendant was charged with two counts of Acting as a Bail Enforcement Agent or Bail 
Recovery Agent without a proper license, class A misdemeanors, one from April 4,2000, and the 
other from April 16,2000. He was also charged with two counts of Unlawful Detention, class B 
misdemeanors, one for each day, and one count of Assault, class B misdemeanor for his conduct on 
April 16, 2000. (R. 1-3). On November 14th and November 15th, 2001, a jury trial was held on these 
charges. On November 15th, 2001, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged on all counts 
against defendant and his co-defendant (R. 252-253). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The defendant in this case acted as a bail bondsman for the victim in this case, Deloy 
Lindley (victim). Defendant posted a $50,000 bond for the victim on the victim's promise to pay 
$5,000. The bond was subsequently reduced by a Judge to $10,000. The bond agreement listed 
collateral, and civil remedies available to Appellant if the $5,000 was not paid, including seizure of 
the collateral.. Around the first part of April 2000, when the victim could not pay the $5,000, it was 
discussed among the parties that a truck that was listed as collateral would be sold. 
2. Defendant had a conversation with a police officer about revoking the victim's bond. He 
was told that the County Attorney's Office would not file criminal charges, but that he could pursue 
the civil remedies that he had under his contract. 
3. On April 4,2000, defendant went to victim's home and told him that he was going to 
revoke his bond and take the victim to jail unless he had his wife sign over the title to the truck that 
was listed as collateral in the contract. The truck title was signed over but the victim was arrested 
anyway and taken by defendant and booked into the Cache County Jail. Defendant was not licensed 
as a Bail Recovery Agent or Bail Enforcement Agent under Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-107 (1998), and 
had not filed the proper paperwork to get the Judge to authorize that the bond be revoked. 
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4. On April 6,2000, victim appeared in front of Judge Thomas L. Wilmore and explained to 
the Judge that his bail bondsman had arrested him and taken him back to jail. The prosecutor 
indicated to the court that it appeared to be a contract dispute between Defendant and the victim. 
Judge Wilmore indicated that "it doesn't seem like he should be held in jail." (See Addendum A, 
page 4, lines 8-12) Judge Wilmore further stated "[t]he bail bondsman doesn't have any right to haul 
you off to jail. I'm going to release you." (Id. at page 5, lines 10-12). 
5. Victim was released from jail by the Court. On April 16,2000, without checking with the 
Court to see why the victim had been released, Defendant, along with co-defendant Lloyd, went back 
to the home of the victim to re-arrest him. Defendant was still not properly licensed to revoke 
victim's bail and had still not requested the Court to revoke the victim's bond. When the victim said 
that Judge Wilmore had released him and that defendant had no authority to take him to jail and 
refused to be arrested by defendant, defendant sprayed him in the face with pepper spray, chased him 
down and tackled him to the ground. Victim testified in trial that he had been punched, kicked, and 
hit with a rock. He also testified that co-defendant Lloyd had pulled a firearm on him and threatened 
him with it. The victim testified that once they had him in the car, defendant told him he was going to 
take the victim up the canyon and kill him. (Transcript November 14th, pages 77-84 & 108-112). 
6. The victim's family called the police as their father was arrested and reported that one of 
the people taking their father had a gun. Cache County Sheriffs Deputies and a Highway Patrol 
Trooper stopped the vehicle in which victim was detained. They observed that victim had been 
sprayed with pepper spray, that no one had attempted to treat him for that exposure, they found the 
firearm they had been told about, and the victim complained to them about injuries he received from 
the defendants. 
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7. The case was investigated and when it was determined that defendant was not properly 
licensed as a bail recovery agent, or bail enforcement agent, charges where filed. Defendant was 
charged with two counts of Acting as a Bail Enforcement Agent or Bail Recovery Agent without a 
proper license, class A misdemeanors, one from April 4, 2000, and the other from April 16,2000. He 
was also charged with two counts of Unlawful Detention, class B misdemeanors, one for each day, 
and one count of Assault, class B misdemeanor for his conduct on April 16, 2000. 
8. In 1998, the Legislature enacted the Bail Bond Recovery Act. This act has existed in the 
same format since that time and strictly prohibits the conduct that defendant was charged with. The 
act was originally numbered Title 53, Chapter 10. However, when compiling the new code sections 
the office of Legislative Research and General Counsel discovered that there were two Chapter 10s in 
Title 53. The other chapter was named the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Act. 
Because there were two chapter 10s, the office of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
renumbered the Bail Bond Recovery Act as Chapter 11. (See Addendum B, also attached to State's 
response to Motion to Dismiss, R. 151-157). 
9. The office of Legislative Research and General Counsel gave notice of this change in the 
Compiler's notes at the end of U.C.A. § 77-20-8.5 in 1998, where it clearly states that Bail Bond 
Recovery, cited in Subsection (3), was renumbered as Chapter 11 by the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel because of the enactment at the same session of another Chapter 10. 
(See Addendum B, also attached to State's Response to Motion to Dismiss, R. 151-157). (Emphasis 
added). 
10. The Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel also gave notice of this change 
at the beginning of Title 53, Chapter 10. The Compiler's notes for that section says "Laws 1998, chs. 
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257, 282 and 343 also enacted a Chapter 10 of this title; those chapters have been renumbered as 
Chapters 11, 13 and 12, respectively." (See Addendum B, also attached to State's Response to 
Motion to Dismiss, R. 151 -157). 
11. Chapter 11 of Title 53 also gives notice. It is titled Bail Bond Recovery Act. It also 
gives notice in the compiler notes that this section was renumbered because there was originally two 
chapter 10s that were enacted. (See Addendum B, also attached to State's Response to Motion to 
Dismiss, R. 151-157). 
12. Before trial, defendant filed a Motion in Limine, asking the trial court to rule on whether 
he could claim a mistake of law defense in this case. Defendant asserted that he was told by a Deputy 
Cache County Attorney that he could just revoke the victim's bond, without an order from the Court 
or a proper license. On March 30,2001, an evidentiaiy hearing was held and Judge Judldns ruled that 
even if he looked at the facts in the light most favorable to defendant, defendant had not made out a 
mistake of law defense. (Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, March 30,2001, and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, R. 122-124). 
13. A couple of weeks before the trial in this case, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss 
claiming that because of an alleged typographical error in the code section, he did not heive proper 
notice that his conduct violated the law.1 (R. 125-142). The State responded and set forth the 
information outlined in paragraphs 8-11 above. In addition, the State presented evidence from the 
Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Criminal Identification, showing that they had written letters 
giving notice of the law requiring a person to be licensed to apprehend a person or surrender them to 
1
 This claim was not asserted by defendant until a couple of weeks before the trial, approximately a year 
and a half after this crime occurred. In none of his prior pleadings or letters to the county attorney did defendant 
ever mention the typographical error. 
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jail. The letter written on November 2, 1999, clearly states that "[a]ny person apprehending and/or 
surrendering a defendant that is not licensed according to (53-11-101) is in violation of the law. 
UC.A. 53-11-124 (1998) establishes a violation of this law as a class A misdemeanor". (See Trial 
Exhibits 3,4, R. 316). The trial court denied the defendant's motion for the reasons stated previously. 
(Transcript November 14, Page 272, at lines 10-20). 
14. The jury returned a finding of guilty as charged on all counts on November 25,2001. (R. 
252-253). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant received a fair trial. The jury was instructed that they needed to find that defendant 
committed the offenses knowingly or voluntarily. The jury was never instructed that this was a strict 
liability offense. The trial court properly ruled that defendant could not establish a mistake of law 
defense. Defendant had sufficient notice of the law's existence. The State did not have to prove that 
defendant knew of the existence of the law or that his conduct would violate the law. Defendant's 
rights were not violated when the trial court refused to allow him to retake the stand to testify about 
matters that the trial court had ruled were inadmissible. The information that defendant sought to 
testify about was information that he had already testified to, that his co-defendant had testified to, 
and that his attorney mentioned in opening statement and closing argument. There is no likelihood 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had defendant been allowed to testify as he 
wanted to. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT NEVER RULED AND THE JURY WAS NEVER 
INSTRUCTED THAT U.C.A. § 53-11-107 WAS A STRICT LIABILITY CRIME. 
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Defendant asserts that as applied to him by the trial judge, the Bail Bond Recovery Act, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-101; 53-11-107, was turned into a strict liability crime. That is simply not 
true. The jury was instructed in each of the elements instructions, that one of the elements that the 
jury needed to find was that defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. (Jury Instructions 2-9, R. 
213-219). In addition, the jury was instructed as to the definition of knowing and intentional. (Jury 
Instructions 10 & 11, R. 221, 222). The State argued that it was defendant's conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result of his conduct. The State argued that it was 
defendant's conscious desire or objective to arrest and detain the victim and take him to jail. The 
State argued that ignorance of law was not a defense even though there was evidence that defendant 
knew or should have known that this conduct would be illegal. The State also argued that it was 
defendant's desire to spray victim with pepper spray, tackle him to the ground, kick him, and threaten 
his life. The jury found that to indeed have been defendant's desire or objective. At no time did the 
trial court instruct or rule that the State did not have to prove the appropriate mens rea. 
Defendant claims that this issue was preserved by the argument at Defendant's Motion in 
Limine, on March 30,2001. He however, at no time argued that he thought that by the trial court's 
actions, the court was creating a strict liability offense. This court should refuse to address that issue 
because it is being raised for the first time on appeal. See Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. Of Edu., 797 
P.2d 412,413 (Utah 1990); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). Had defendant brought 
the issue up before the trial court, they may have been granted an instruction or remedy that would 
have clarified the issue to the jury to their satisfaction. Without doing anything however, if there was 
an error made by the trial court, defendant lead the court into that error by not raising his objection. 
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Defendant should not be able to benefit from any alleged error on appeal. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201,1220 (Utah 1993). 
A. Defendant claimed that he was not acting as a bail bond recovery agent, but was 
making a citizens arrest. 
Defendant wants to claim that this jury had no choice but to convict him because of the way 
the trial court ruled on his motion. That is simply not the case. In defendant's opening statement, he 
claimed that the testimony of the State's witnesses could not be believed because it had changed so 
many times. Defense counsel also stated that they would show that defendant acted within the law. 
(Transcript November 14th, pages 59-60). 
Defendant also testified that he believed that he was acting legally because he was making a 
citizen's arrest and not acting as a Bail Recovery Agent. (Transcript November 15, page 70, 80-81). 
The jury, after hearing all of the testimony, and viewing Mr. Norton's demeanor and lack of candor, 
simply chose not to believe Mr. Norton's claim that he was making a citizen's arrest 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO RAISE A MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE. 
In the event that this Court believes that defendant has sufficiently raised the issue at the trial 
court, the State will address the issue of the Mistake of Law Defense. In December of 2000, 
defendant's attorney filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to rule on whether he was entitled 
to raise a mistake of law defense. (R. 46-85). That memorandum was responded to by the Cache 
County Attorney's Office. The Weber County Attorney's Office, at the request of the Cache County 
Attorney's Office, took over the prosecution of this case to avoid the appearance of a conflict. An 
evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of the mistake of law defense on March 30,2001. At that 
hearing, the trial court heard testimony and argument concerning the claim. Defendant was claiming 
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that Tony Baird from the Cache County Attorney's Office told him that he could go arrest the victim 
and take him back to jail if the victim had violated his contract with defendant. 
Tony Baird, Deputy Cache County Attorney testified that he had a conversation with a police 
officer, where the officer asked him if he would be willing to file criminal charges of theft against the 
victim, where the victim had allegedly misrepresented collateral on his contract with Mr. Norton. Mr. 
Baird told the officer that he would not file criminal charges and to tell defendant that he had a civil 
remedy under his contract. (See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing. March 30, 2001, pages 14-15). 
Mr. Baird then testified that at some point he had a conversation with defendant. He could not put a 
date on the conversation and could not say whether it happened before or after victim was arrested 
and these crimes were committed. Id. at 15-16. Mr. Baird remembered that defendant was 
complaining about Don Linton (another prosecutor in the Cache County Attorney's Office), and that 
Don had it out for him (defendant). Mr. Baird testified that the only thing he remembers talking to 
defendant about, was about Mr. Linton.2 Mr. Baird testified that he does not recall ever having a 
conversation with defendant about his authority to arrest the victim. Id. at page 16, line 13. Mr. 
Baird testified that he never rendered an official opinion in writing or otherwise. Mr. Baird denied 
that he ever told defendant he could go arrest the victim. Id- at page 17, line 18. 
The trial court then viewed all of the evidence and proffered evidence in the light most 
favorable to defendant's claims. (Transcript of Hearing, March 30,2001, Page 23, line 21, through 
Page 24, line 1). The trial court then viewed the testimony in regard to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 
(1974). (See Addendum C). Even with giving defendant every benefit of the doubt, the trial court 
2
 Mr. Linton did not have any involvement in this case until he appeared in front of Judge Wilmore on 
April 6, 2000. (See Addendum A.) At the time that defendant picked victim up the second time, he was not aware 
of why the victim had been released. (See Transcript November 15th, 2001, page 70.) It was not until after that time 
that defendant would have reason to believe that Mr. Linton "had it out for him." 
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ruled that defendant had not met the required elements for a mistake of law defense. The court found 
that Mr. Baird was not acting in a position of responsibility for interpreting the law, that any 
conversation was an informal conversation and was not an official statement, and that there was no 
written order or grant of permission. (Transcript March 20,2001, page 24). The trial court entered 
appropriate findings of fact, and conclusions of law. (R. 122-124). 
Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence to show that Judge Judkins ruling was in error. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Tanner v. Carter, 20 P.3d 332, 336 (Utah 2001), the Court held 
that when an appellant challenges a trial court's findings, that appellant must "marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." "Where the 
appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, we need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the 
findings." Id. Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in this case to show that Judge Judkins 
findings were not supported by the evidence. Judge Judkins heard the hearing and gave defendant 
every benefit of the doubt. Defendant has failed to produce any fact or other evidence that would 
make Judge Judkin's ruling improper. 
A. Defendant's alleged ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense in this case. 
Defendant, then as well as now, wants to claim that he should not be guilty of these offenses 
because he was (allegedly) not aware of the existence of the law requiring him to be licensed to arrest 
someone and take them to jail. He claims that this (alleged) ignorance of the law should be a defense 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 (1974). The trial court heard the hearing and listened to the 
witness who testified. Based on his observations of the facts, Judge Judkins ruled that defendant was 
not entitled to claim that defense. Judge Judkins, should be allowed a "measure of discretion" on how 
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he applied the facts that he heard in the evidentiary hearing, to the law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
935-40 (Utah 1994). 
This jury was instructed that they had to find that defendant acted knowingly and voluntarily 
in committing each of his crimes. Defendant wanted the jury to have to find the additional element 
that he knew what he was doing was a crime. That is not an element that the State is required to 
prove to convict someone of a crime. In a Utah Supreme Court case almost a centuiy ago Skeen v. 
Craig, 86 P. 487, 491 (Utah 1906), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 'there is no principle of law 
more closely adhered to and followed than the rule that every person is presumed to know the law; 
and when a party is accused of a crime he cannot be heard to say and to successfully plead as a 
defense that he was ignorant of the law which he is charged with having violated. In no case can one 
enter a court...with the sole and naked defense that when he did the thing explained of he did not 
know of the existence of the law which he violated." Id. 
Even though defendant claims to have not known of the existence of this law, there was 
ample evidence for the jury to believe that defendant did know that his conduct was prohibited. 
Defendant's own contract contained no provision that would allow him to revoke the bond for non-
payment. The only time that the contract allowed defendant to seek to revoke the bond was if the 
victim had not given him notice of court dates or for a failure to appear in court. (See Transcript 
November 15th, 2001, Pages 105-108). Defendant had conversations with a Cache County Sheriffs 
Deputy where he was told this was a civil matter. (Transcript November 15th, 2001, page 79, line 20, 
through page 80, line 1). Although Deputy Larson did not testify at trial, if his testimony would have 
become relevant at trial, he would have testified that he himself told defendant that he needed to seek 
an arrest warrant before trying to pick up defendant. Other Deputies who testified at trial, testified 
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that Mr. Norton knew he could not make the arrest without having a deputy present. (Transcript 
November 14th, 2001, page 221, lines 23-25). 
Sargent James Allred of the Department of Public safety testified about his duties with the 
Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) in the years of 1999 and 2000. Sargent Allred testified about 
the Bail Bond Recovery Act being passed by the legislature in 1998,3 and the reasons that such an act 
was required. He further testified about BCI's efforts to notify people of the change in the law. 
Sargent Allred personally sent letters explaining that if someone was not licensed as a bail bond 
recovery agent, and they arrested someone to revoke a bond, they were committing a class A 
misdemeanor. Sargent Allred testified that these letters, along with a list of current license holders 
were mailed out approximately every quarter. (Transcript November 14th, page 205, line 11). These 
letters were mailed out to courts, jails, sheriffs offices and later to bond companies. (Transcript 
November 14th, page 204, line 12). 
After the victim was illegally arrested the first time, he appeared before Judge Wilmore on 
April 6th, 2001. At that time the prosecutor expressed to the judge that he did not know how a bail 
bondsman acquires the kind of authority to just arrest the victim and bring him back to jail, and that it 
seemed like a contract issue between the victim and the bondsman (See Addendum A, also included 
as State's Trial Exhibit # 1, pages 3& 4). Judge Wilmore then told the victim that "[t]he bail 
bondsman doesn't have any right to haul you off to jail. I'm going to release you." (Addendum A, 
page 5, line 10). Defendant then found out that Judge Wilmore has released the victim, and without 
checking into the reason, went right out and arrested victim again on April 16th, 2000. If defendant 
3
 It is interesting to note that the same year that this licensing requirement was passed, defendant testified 
that his licensing requirement as a bail bondsman also changed, and he was aware of that change. (See Transcript 
November 15th, page 20, line 17). 
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did as he claims to have done, and looked for the law in the code book, or online, he would have 
received notice that his conduct would have been illegal. (See paragraphs 8-11, in Statement of 
Relevant Facts). 
ffl, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION IN NOT 
ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO RETAKE THE WITNESS STAND. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when not allowing defendant to retake the witness 
stand to testify about issues that the trial court had ruled were inadmissible, and where defendant had 
already given testimony concerning those matters. A trial court's determination of admissibility or 
relevancy of testimony is review under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. ex rel. A.D.. 6 p.3d 
1137, 1138 (Utah App. 2000). Also, as quoted by defendant in his docketing statement, "[t]he trial 
court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of [evidence], and such decisions are 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, we will not reverse unless the 
decision exceeds the limits of responsibility." Quoting State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 
1993). 
Defendant wanted to retake the stand and testify again of his efforts to know what the law was 
and assert to the jury that he did not know he was violating the law. The Court's refusal to allow 
defendant to re-take the stand to testify again of his alleged efforts to find out about the law was 
proper. The Court had previously ruled that such evidence did not provide defendant with a defense, 
the defendant had already testified of those facts, and any further testimony on the matter would have 
been cumulative, potentially confusing, and a waist of time under the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
403. 
Defendant claims that he was denied by the Court, the ability to testify concerning the efforts 
that he made to determine the law before he acted. That is false. Defendant testified in direct 
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examination that before he acted he looked up the law on "on-line" to make sure that the 
requirements were the same. (Transcript November 15th, 2001, pages 38 & 39). Defendant testified 
that it was a common practice for him to arrest people who violated their bonds and take them to jail, 
but that it had been a while so he wanted to make sure of what the law was. Id. He looked in the 
Utah Code under § 77-20-8.5 (1998). He testified that he believed he could legally do what he did. 
Id 
Defendant also testified that he talked to Tony Baird at the Cache County Attorney's Office 
and to other law enforcement officers. He was not allowed to testify as to hearsay matters, but did 
testify about contacting those individuals. (See Transcript November 15th, pages 40 & 41). In 
addition to defendant testifying about those things on direct examination, his co-defendant Mr. 
Lloyd testified in direct examination, that he asked defendant about the legality of the arrest and 
Norton showed him the law and what it said and that nothing they read together prohibited them from 
doing what they did. (See Transcript November 15th, page 114). Lloyd also testified that defendant 
had talked to his Attorney, and to his brother, whom defendant testified was a police officer in 
another state. Mr. Lloyd testified that their state of mind when they committed these acts was that 
"everything was completely legitimate and there would be no issues." (See Transcript November 
15th, page 114, line 16). Through Lloyd the jury heard that the co-defendants did not know that then-
conduct would violate the law and that they had made efforts to find out what the law was. Mr. 
Galloway, the defense attorney, in his opening statement stated: 
As I said, it's a strange case, you're going to hear about two individuals that did everything in 
their power, bent over backwards to stay within the law, they had the help of State officials, 
they had the help of policemen, they conferred with individuals, they did everything in their 
power to do what they could do to stay within the law. We believe they did stay within the 
law, and believe that you will find that at the end of this trial. (Transcript November 14th, 
page 60). 
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In his closing argument, Mr. Galloway also talks about the effort that Mr. Norton has gone to 
to make sure he is acting legally. He states that Mr. Norton talked police officers about what he 
should do; he talks to the "County Attorneys"; he looks through what he thinks is the proper 
paperwork; he went out with his brother who is a police officer, believing that he had authority to 
revoke the bond; that the co-defendants thought everything was legit, and that they looked at the laws 
over the internet. (Transcript November 15th, pages 205-206). 
The only objection placed on the record about not allowing Mr. Norton to retake the stand, 
was that Mr. Norton wanted to testiiy about the way that the code was written. (Transcript November 
15th, page 155). Defendant has not preserved any other argument for appeal. The record clearly 
shows that defendant did present evidence about his efforts to determine the law. Defendant claims 
that the trial court prohibited him from presenting evidence about his state of mind, that he 
(allegedly) did not know that his conduct was violating the law. That is likewise not true. Defendant 
testified about the efforts that he went through, the people he talked to. His attorney told the jury that 
defendant talked to many people, looked at the law, and believed he had authority to do what he did. 
His co-defendant testified that they looked at the law and believed that everything was authorized. 
The jury heard all of this evidence and simply did not believe defendant's version of the facts. 
A. Even if this court believes that the trial court erred in not allowing Mr. Norton to 
retake the witness stand, that alleged error was harmless. 
Defendant claims that he should have been allowed to testify as to the things that the co-
defendant testified to. The State believes that defendant was given that opportunity. However, if this 
Court does not reach that conclusion, and believes that the trial court's ruling prohibiting Mr. Norton 
from re-testifying was in error, such alleged error was harmless. As to the second date, April 16th, 
2000, defendant and his co-defendant Mr. Lloyd were charged with the same conduct and the same 
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offenses. Defendant claims that he should have been allowed to testify as Mr. Lloyd did. Mr. Lloyd 
testified that he had asked defendant about the legality of the arrest and Norton showed him the law 
and what it said and that nothing they read together prohibited them from doing what they did. (See 
Transcript November 15th, page 114). Lloyd also testified that defendant had talked to his Attorney, 
and to his brother, whom defendant testified was a police officer in another state. Mr. Lloyd testified 
that their state of mind when they committed these acts was that "everything was completely 
legitimate and there would be no issues." (See Transcript November 15th, page 114, line 16). 
Even though the jury heard about all of these efforts that Mr. Lloyd had allegedly taken, along 
with Mr. Norton, they still convicted Lloyd as charged of all of the charges. It would not have made a 
difference with this jury had Mr. Norton testified to the same thing as Mr. Lloyd. He still would have 
been found guilty as charged by this jury. In the case of Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc. v. White. 40 
P.3d 1155,1159 (Utah App. 2002), the Utah Court of Appeals held that: 
[Ejven where error is found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of 
all of the evidence presented at trial, it appears that "absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that a different result would have been reached."...Moreover the person asserting 
error has the burden to show not only that the error occurred but also that it was substantial 
and prejudicial." Id. 
Even if this court believes that there was an error in this case, there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the result would have been different, where Lloyd was convicted as charged. Defendant has 
failed in his burden to show that the alleged error was substantial and prejudicial. Defendant has no 
evidence of that and any argument would be wholly speculative. 
B. Even if this Court believes that defendant is entitled to a new trial on the Bail 
Bond Recovery charges, there is independent evidence sufficient to sustain the 
unlawful detention and assault conviction from April 16th, 2000. 
Even if this court decides that Mr. Norton is entitled to a new trial on the Bail Bond Recovery 
charges, there is independent evidence to support defendant's other convictions for the date of April 
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16,2000. Judge Wilmore had released the victim after he was arrested the first time. Defendant, by 
going back and arresting him without even checking into the reason for his release, was at least 
reckless as to whether he was committing unlawful detention. 
As to the assault, there is independent evidence sufficient to support that charge even if this 
Court believes that defendant is entitled to a new trial on all of the charges. The victim testified that 
when he was being arrested by defendant, first he was pepper sprayed, he was then tackled and hit 
with a rock, he was later punched and had a gun stuck to his chest. The victim testified that defendant 
told him that he was going to take him up the canyon and kill him. (Transcript November 14th, pages 
77-84 & 108-112). These actions went above and beyond any action necessary to properly effect the 
victim's arrest, and turned those actions into assault, for which defendant was properly convicted. 
This court should look at the convictions of unlawful detention and assault from April 16th, 2000, in 
the light most favorable to the jury verdict. In the case of State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994), the Utah Supreme Court held that when reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, 
"we reemphasize the limited role of the appellate court. In such cases, we afford great deference to 
the jury verdict." Quoting State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 1991). The Court further held 
that "[w]e will not sit as a second fact finder, nor will we determine the credibility of the witnesses. 
That is the prerogative of the jury. 'Where there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a 
reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict'". Goddard at 543, quoting 
State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273,285 (Utah 1989), cert denied. 494 U.S. 1090,110 S.Ct. 1837,108 
L.Ed.2d 965 (1990). The jury viewed the demeanor of the witnesses and chose to believe the victim 
about the facts of this case. Even if this Court believes that defendant is entitled to a new trial on the 
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Bail Bond Recover}' charges, this Court should sustain the jury's verdicts on the assault 
detention convictions, 
cm ELUSION 
~ " .idam received a fair trial in this case !he trial iv>rt did not create a strict liability 
offense, ana aeie:iJuM :^ t: . ;«„ .... ,aa< at the time * -i uu a *.» i iie jury was instructed that they 
needed to find that defendant acted knowingh : Defends = I 
found not guilt\ K cause he was nuking a citizen's aires! ^ c .T hearing him testify and observing his 
, •.: : .. ui on the facts from the evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court properly ruled that Cww«ajnt was not entitled to assert a mistake of law defense. Defen.* •*• ^  
however, still put before the jury evidence about his (alleged) efforts iv determine what tK- law was 
nl tin til hr wm ,ie1ni|"" ,ip|iin|'ii,i.ih II1 nil tcMiil looking u. ,;^ ^ •. ,... L,IL -ruernet, 
that he spoke with police officers, including his brother, that he spoke with atiorne\ \s. me uamg the 
L aciiL - * uiu} ,.* * .lice, and that he believed that he was authorized to do what he did. ' Die 
jury, after hearing all of the mdeiuv and icadini1 Ihr iihlmi fiuii ml" I in \\u\\ui dt ridcdl illllial doloiidunl 
was still guiitv. The jury convicted the co-defendant as charged even after he testified to everything 
.,.!(. .• i claimed lie was not allowed lo, I he (rial )udge properly excluded defendant from 
retaking "the stand because his testimony would have been ci unulative It i ekn ant potentially 
confusing to the jury, and a waist of time. The defendant's alleged ignorance or mistake of law is not 
a defend In ln,-< \ \n I n I n Ihr i .«i 11 i mn I i I t J M M I I n I I I \ ittini was outrageous and 
criminal li defendant is allowed to claim ignorance or mistake of law as a defense, 'then that \v< mid 
i .c every aeic.iu^ .v. v..u.... aiai defense and put the State to the burden of proving that ever}1 
defendant knew he ^ * -*. • * 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because this case presents no complex or novel question, and because the facts and legal 
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, the State requests neither oral argument 
nor a published opinion in this case. 
DATED T H I S ^ A day of October, 2002 
^ - f r w j 6te<t^)f, 
DEAN SAUNDERS 
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR DELIVERY 
I In is to certify that a true and correct copy ot the toregoing was hand delivered, to 
» • 11N I W 1 I 
\ llorney for Defendant 
Law Office of Barton J. Warren 
261 East 300 South, Suite 175 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841II 
DATED this [[_ day of October, 2002. 
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The title and registration to an f81 Ford truck. To a '91 
Lc gan stock trailer; and the title to a $10,000 snowmobile. 
I I«: 1 • • >] :i 1 i ] 1 • L i 11 1 J: i a s :i t a ] ] i i I < i J 5 1 i ] ] t 1: i, t : e w m i : j a i 1. 
THE COURT: Who t h r e w you :i i I j a i l ? 
M R 1 111 ID I E1: ! 11 e I : • a i ] 1 • n d s m a n . 
• THE C O U R T : Who is that? 
MR I .11: IE I i.E : ! • I li • n I I xi I .01 ) 
THE CLERK: Mi ke N o r t o n . 
MR I II ] i: 1 1.E ! ! 1 1. i il :< I I : )i 1: .01 i 
THE COURT: He j u s t came a n d t o o k you t o j a i l ? 
Mi- I.I i MI 'I il i i i , i i i in in i 11.11J M. ru1 . i i J i rii i,. i.i J 
my s t u f f a n d e v e r y t h i n g . T h a t ' s a l l 1 h a a . 1 h a v e a f a m i l 
THE : . . . n t o n . 
MR. LINTON. ^ nave no explanation for this, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT- ' ',CVP ^  r ::c ... Lhe file for $50,000. 
P .:..
 t .. -- . ^ w a r ..1 bondsman 
acquires t hat k i nd o f a u t ho rit y, Yo ur Honor. 
MI 1. LIN'DLE Y • He still has all of my stuff. 
THE COURT: Mr, Lindley appeared on March 20th in 
tront of me. That was 1 Iis initial appearance. The state 
stipulated to bail being reduced to IQ,00D. 
MR. LINDLEY: And T tcld hir tha* that car 
THE C"""- • - • , . •. ~^ ;v 
him A pretrial conference was scheduled for this coming 
Monday ,it "] i ' ' st.l ' f here i: a bund in i. he tile tor 
v 50,001). It was posted by .94 Hour Bail Bonds. 
Mk . LJLUDLJLJ I i j h llu denied that and put me back 
i i j a i ] t w o d a y s a g o , I *c r, c •_:. .:. -^ - iwi -i o hours. He 
!: :i ] ] ] ast 1:1: ie t::i 1: j e to my t ^ ".^ , \ - ° ^ th^ -^--i- trai ler 
and title to a snowmobile and still has all of it in his 
DOSsession. 
MR. LINTON: It seems like a contract issi ie t etweei i 
this Mr. Norton and the defendant and it doesnft seem 
appropriate to use the jail. -r.f--. ~-~ - i 
THE COURT: It doesnft seem, like he should be hel I 
JL 11 J Q-L -L . 
MP, LINTON I would suggest, Your Honor, if he has 
r-)s L e a t r i e b a ± - i Mi f 11 11 i 111 hi i ' i nin e>; f i i 11 ] 1111 i n i r 
. n g -
Eonds? .7: yc „. re suggesting he be released? 
INIf I I M T f N W. u l . [ . I I . ;, niri'iv b , J J i 
THE COURT: He posted a bond. 
Ml I 1 MTHN i i i )i t i I i l i i H Mi | 
to the court's discretion, but I donft quite understand what 
THE COURT: 1 li Perry, anything? Are you working? 
I II 1 1 111 ID I iE ! ! : } : e s , I \ \ • r k f o r my grand f a t h e r I 
have total (inaudible) on his farm. 
Page 4 
Mr. J L I N D L E Y : M a r : . : : - s e n . 
r
 i i ll I I I I i I i : i J t III ? 
MR. LJNriLrJV. *;-:*. .*. . I :. ave a ::otal disability. 
i. 
THE COURT: How lcna have vou lived .* m e area? 
h - -.brs. 
THE COURT: -\ ; : - :: * - * * * -T u ""~e evidence 
.:crt . lorid. It 
red ro _-,_.• "h^ - ^  horisrna:: dcesn*L have any 
von ^ f: * a- ;oing to release you. 
,:_ ^c'p^p,^
 a s socn. as *r.ey can process you today. 
MR, LII._. -A-
THE COURT. INWW, • a"j.c iu j^ e in court Monday. 
MR. LINDLE V- T " ~ 
THE COURT; At i.ou. J.S Mr. P e n ; <]- i ' Vr 
? Did I hear y~u say y--;'v.= r.-red --• 
M R ^ L I N D L E y ; s h a n n o n Dem ] e , . 
THE COUR^- f~ Mr. Demler wi 11 be represent!:::: ycu. 
MR. LINDLEi: ies. 
THE COURT • 0 ]•" -•;- M a k e s u r e he's here, t o o , 
MR. !,XFT * " : 
THE COUR. - Thank you 1 1,,, i, I- y -i, Hi, Terry. 
• I I I 1 1 1 1 ! I i ! i , 11 u i q e . 
(Hearing concluded.). 
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53-9-119 PUBLIC SAFETY CODE 298 299 CRIMINAL INVESTIG/ 
18) All fines collected under this section shall be deposited in the General 
Fund 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 53-9-118, e n a c t e d h\ L. The 1998 amendment by ch. 282, effective 
1995, ch . 314, § 21 ; 1998, ch . 212, § 3 5; 1998, May 4, 1998, substituted "peace officer" for uIaw 
ch . 282, * 41 . enforcement officer" in Subsection (l)(d). 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 amend- This section is set out as reconciled by the 
ment by ch. 212, effective May 4, 1998, rewrote Office of Legislative Research and General 
the section. Counsel 
53-9-119 Violation « Penalty. 
Any person who violates am provision of this chapter is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor 
Section 
53-10-204 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 53-9-119, e n a c t e d by L. 
1995, ch . 314, § 22; 1998, ch . 212, * 16. 
A m e n d m e n t No te s . — Th* 1998 amend-
53-9-120. !u pealed. 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted uany 
person" for "a licensee, registrant, or employee" 
.it the beginning 
R e p e a l s . — Laws 1998, ch. 212, Jj 17 repeals concerning the grandfather provision of those 
§ 53-9-120, as enacted by L. 1995, ch 314, § 23, persons validly licensed, effective May 4, 1998. 
CHAPTER 10 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND 
TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION 
C o m p i l e r ' s No tes . — Laws 1998, chs 257. 282 and 343 also enacted a Chapter 10 of thr 
those chapters have been renumbered as Chapters 11, 13 and 12, respectively 
•iilllillillHII,
 h | | 
title, I 
P a r t 1 
IJMIIM i'dl P n n is ions 
Section 
53-10-101. Short title. 
53-10-102. Definitions. 
53-10-103. Division — Creation — Direc-
tor appointment and qualifi-
cations. 
53-10-104. Division duties. 
53-10-105. Assistance to law enforcement 
agencies — Investigation of 
crimes — Laboratory facili-
ties. 
53-10-106 Cooperation with agencies of 
any state or nation. 
53-10-107 Admissibility in evidence of 
certified copies of division 
files 
53 10 I Oh Restrictions on access, use, 
and contents of division 
records — Limited use of 
records for employment pur-
poses — Challenging accu-
racy of records — Usage fees 
— Missing children records 
•3-10-109. Telecommunications systems. 
Section 
53-10-110. 
53-10-111. 
53 10-112 
53-10-11,1 
53-10-11 I 
Authority ol officers and offi-
cials to take fingerprints, 
photographs, and other 
data 
Refusal to provide information 
— False information — Mis-
demeanor. 
Director and officers to have 
peace officer powers 
agencies to cooperate 
li division. 
>rity regarding drug pre-
cuisors. 
P a r t 2 
B u r e a u of C r i m i n a l Iden t i f i ca t ion 
53-10-201 Bureau of Criminal Identifica-
tion — Creation — Bureau 
Chief appointment, qualifi-
cations, and compensation. 
53-10-201' i Yiminal identification — Du-
ties of bureau 
53-10-202 f> Bureau services — Fees. 
53-10-20'! Missing persons — Reports — 
Notification. 
53-10-200 
53-10-2()ei 
53-10-201 
53-10-20h 
53-10-208 1. 
53-10-209 
,33-10-210 
53-10-211. 
53-10-212 
Missing person recon 
Confidentiality — Ava 
ity-
Uniform crime reportin 
tern — Use of data. 
Collection of informatioi 
Peace officers, prosec 
and magistrates to s 
information to state 
F.B.I. — Notification 
rest based on warrant 
Definition — Offense 
eluded on statewide 
rant system — Trans 
tion fee to be includ 
Statewide warrant s 
responsibility — Q 
control — Training — 
nical support — Trans 
costs. 
Magistrates and court 
to supply information 
Penal institutions and 
hospital to supply in 
tion. 
Response for requests — 
Notice required of a n 
school employee fo 
trolled substance or 
fense. 
Supplies and equipmt 
compliance h\ re 
agencies. 
P a r t 3 
C r i m i n a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s B u r e a 
53-10-30] Criminal Inves t iga te 
reau — Creation — 
GENEI 
I'ili-KI 1IHIL Whurt i i l h , 
This chapU'i r- I n<m n i 
Services Act." 
Lli si in-) ! . 1953, 53-5-101, e n a c t " 
1093, ch 234. & 178; r e n u m b e r e d 
1998, ch . 263, § 7. 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 
ment renumbered this section, which 
i>;i-IO-l02 Hi b u l l i o n s , 
A s u s e d i n 1 h i i L q i l u 
1 i \ I in mi i in in in in 11 i t io11 ml i i 
i i l i u ' iiLtor L L t L i t i o n , a p p n 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND TECHNICAL SERVICES 53-10-102 
Section 
53-10-204. 
53-10-205. 
53-10-206. 
53-10-207. 
53-10-208. 
Missing person records — 
Confidentiality — Availabil-
ity. 
Uniform crime reporting sys-
tem — Use of data. 
Collection of information. 
Peace officers, prosecutors, 
and magistrates to supply 
information to state and 
F.B.I. — Notification of ar-
rest based on warrant. 
Definition — Offenses in-
cluded on statewide war-
rant system — Transporta-
tion fee to be included — 
Statewide warrant system 
responsibility — Quality 
control — Training — Tech-
nical support — Transaction 
costs. 
Magistrates and court clerks 
to supply information. 
Penal institutions and state 
hospital to supply informa-
tion. 
Response for requests — Fees. 
Notice required of arrest of 
school employee for con-
trolled substance or sex of-
fense. 
Supplies and equipment for 
compliance by reporting 
agencies. 
Part 3 
Criminal Investigations Bureau 
53-10-301. Criminal Investigations Bu-
reau — Creation — Bureau 
53-10-208.1. 
53-10-209. 
53-10-210. 
53-10-211. 
53-10-212. 
Section 
53-10-302. 
53-10-303. 
53-10-304. 
53-10-305. 
Chief appointment, qualifi-
cations, and compensation. 
Bureau duties. 
Financial Fraud and Money 
Laundering Forfeiture Ac-
count created — Revenue 
sources — Use of account 
designated. 
Narcotics and alcoholic bever-
age enforcement — Respon-
sibility and jurisdiction. 
Duties of bureau chief. 
Part 4 
Bureau of Forensic Services 
53-10-401. Bureau of Forensic Services — 
Creation — Bureau Chief 
appointment, qualifications, 
and compensation. 
53-10-402. Bureau duties. 
53-10-403. Blood analysis — Application 
to offenders. 
53-10-404. Blood analysis — Require-
ment to obtain sample. 
53-10-405. Blood analysis — Sample to be 
drawn by professional. 
53-10-406. Blood analysis — Bureau re-
sponsibilities. 
Part 5 
Bureau of Communications 
53-10-501. Bureau of Communications — 
Creation — Bureau Chief 
appointment, qualifications, 
and compensation. 
53-10-502. Bureau duties. 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
53-10-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Criminal Investigations and Technical 
Services Act." 
^History iist : C. 1953, 53-5-101, enacted by L. 
993, ch. 234, § 178; renumbered by L. 
998, ch. 263, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
appeared as § 53-5-101, and substituted 
"Criminal Investigations and Technical Ser-
vices Act" for "Law Enforcement and Technical 
Services Act." 
3-10-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administration of criminal justice" means performance of any of the 
following: detection, apprehension, detention, pretrial release, posttrial 
77-20-8 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS tence. Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739 
, , P.2d 1108 (Utah 1987). 
Liability of bondsman. 
Termination of bonding authority. Termination of bonding authority. 
—Notice and hearing. 
Writ of prohibition. - N o t i c e and hearing. 
Liability of bondsman. Circuit court abused its discretion in not 
Bondsman is liable only for "all appearances providing notice and hearing prior to termina-
required of the defendant." He is not liable for tion of respondents' bonding authority, 
payment of the defendant's fine, nor is he liable Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739 P.2d 1108 
for the defendant's fidelity to the terms of his (Utah 1987). 
probation. Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1987). Writ of prohibition. 
The statutory phrase "up to and including Suspension without notice of bail bondsmen's 
surrender of the defendant in execution of any authority to post bail in circuit court during 
sentence imposed" clearly indicates an intent to pendency in district court of petition challeng-
extend liability beyond the imposition of sen- ing lawfulness of certain forfeitures was im-
tence. It contemplates the defendant's appear- proper. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 
ing and surrendering himself to serve his sen- 956 (Utah 1987). 
77-20-8. Grounds for detaining or releasing defendant on 
conviction and prior to sentence. 
(1) Upon conviction, by plea or trial, the court shall order that the convicted 
defendant who is waiting imposition or execution of sentence be detained, 
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence presented by the 
defendant that the defendant is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, 
and will not pose a danger to the physical, psychological, or financial and 
economic safety or well-being of any other person or the community if released. 
(2) If the court finds the defendant does not need to be detained, the court 
shall order the release of the defendant on suitable conditions, which may 
include the conditions under Subsection 77-20-10(2). 
History: C. 1953, 77-20-8, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1988, ch. 160, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments Criminal Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 349. 
in Utah Law — Statutory Enactments — C.J.S. — 8 C.J.S. Bail § 43. 
77-20-8.5. Sureties — Surrender of defendant — Arrest of 
defendant. 
(1) (a) The sureties may at any time prior to a forfeiture of their bail 
surrender the defendant and obtain exoneration of their bail by filing 
written requests at the time of the surrender. 
(b) To effect surrender, certified duplicate copies of the undertaking 
shall be delivered to a peace officer, who shall detain the defendant in his 
custody as upon a commitment, and shall in writing acknowledge the 
surrender upon one copy of the undertaking. This certified copy of the 
undertaking upon which the acknowledgment of surrender is endorsed 
shall be filed with the court. The court may then, upon proper application, 
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order the undertaking exonerated and may order a refund of any paid 
premium, or part of a premium, as it finds just. 
(2) For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the sureties may arrest 
him at any time before they are finally exonerated and at any place within the 
state. 
* (3) A surety acting under this section is subject to the provisions of Title 53, 
Chapter 10, Bail Bond Recovery. 
History: C. 1953, 77-20-8.5, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 160, § 3; 1998, ch. 257, § 25. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection 
iB). 
Compiler's Notes. — Title 53, Chapter 10, 
Bail Bond Recovery, cited in Subsection (3), was 
renumbered as Chapter 11 by the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel be-
cause of the enactment at the same session of 
another Chapter 10 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Extent of rights of sureties 
Cited 
Extent of rights of sureties. 
If sureties do not avail themselves of the 
rights given to them, they will be estopped in 
an action on the undertaking from denying that 
the principal was liable to arrest upon the 
charge, to answer which the undertaking sued 
on was given United States v Eldredge, 5 Utah 
189,14 P 42 (1887), appeal dismissed, 145 U S 
636, 12 S Ct 980, 36 L Ed 857 (1892) 
As a general rule an arrest and surrender of 
the principal, to be effectual as an exoneration 
of the surety, must have been made before 
liability of the surety under the bond or recog-
nizance had by forfeiture or judgment become 
fixed, and could not be done as of right after the 
forfeiture or judgment had been paid or the 
surety otherwise discharged Dickson v 
Mullings, 66 Utah 282, 241 P 840, 43 A L R 
136 (1925) 
Surety on bail bond forfeited for nonappear-
ance of principal to answer charge of felonious 
assault could not, two years after payment of 
judgment and discharge of surety, have princi-
pal arrested, without legal process, by police in 
another jurisdiction Dickson v Mullmgs, 66 
Utah 282, 241 P 840, 43 A.L R 136 (1925) 
Cited in Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc v Fifth 
Dist Court, 933 P2d 1011 (Utah Ct App 1997) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Statutory Enactments — 
Criminal Law, 1989 Utah L Rev 349 
77-20-9. Disposition of forfeitures. 
If by reason of the neglect of the defendant to appear, money deposited 
instead of bail or money paid by sureties on surety bond is forfeited and the 
forfeiture is not discharged or remitted, the clerk with whom it is deposited or 
paid shall, immediately after final adjournment of the court, pay over the 
money forfeited as follows: 
(1) the forfeited bail cases in or appealed from district courts shall be 
distributed as provided in Section 78-3-14.5; 
(2) the forfeited bail in cases in precinct justice courts or m municipal 
justice courts shall be distributed as provided m Sections 78-5-116 and 
78-5-135; 
(3) the forfeited bail in cases in justice courts where the offense is not 
triable in that court shall be paid into the General Fund; and 
(4) the forfeited bail in cases not provided for in this section shall be 
paid 50% to the state treasurer and the remainmg 50% to the county 
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<2) provides facilities and acts as a public safety answering point to 
answer and respond to 911 calls from a region; 
(3) provides professional emergency dispatch and communications sup-
port for law enforcement, emergency medical, fire suppression, highway 
maintenance, jmblic works, and public safety agencies representing mu-
nicipal, county, state, and federal governments; and 
<4) coordinates incident response. 
History: C. 1953,53-10-502, enacted by L. 
1998, ch. 263, § 44; 1999, ch. 21, § 48. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
•Hieat, effective May 3, 1999, substituted "911" 
for "9-1-1* in Subsection (2). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 263 
became effective on May 4, 1998, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
J wit 
CHAPTER 11 
BAIL BOND RECOVERY 
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was enacted as Chapter 10 of this title, it was renumbered, 
wi h section references changed accordmgiy, by the Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel because of the enactment of another chapter with the same number. ^ 
Section 
53-11-10L Title. 
53-11-102. Definitions. 
53-11-103. Commissioner of Public Safety 
administers — Licensure — 
Rulemaking. 
53-11-104. Board. 
53-11-105. Powers and duties of board. 
53-11-106. Board meetings and hearings 
— Quorum. 
53-11-107. Licenses — Classifications — 
Prohibited acts. 
53-11-108. Licensure — Basic qualifica-
tions. 
53-11-109. Licensure ~ Bail enforcement 
agent. 
53-11-110. Bail enforcement agent as 
agency — Bond — Workers' 
compensation. 
53-11-111. Licensure — Bail recovery 
agent — Requirements and 
limitations 
53-11-112. Licensure — Bail recovery ap-
prentices — Requirements 
and limitations 
53-11-113. Bail recovery agent and bail 
recovery apprentice licen-
sure — Liability insurance 
— Fee — Workers' compen-
sation. 
Section 
53-11-114. 
53-11-115. 
53-11-116. 
53-11-116.5. 
53-11-117. 
53-11-118. 
53-11-119 
53-11-120. 
53-11-121. 
53-11-122. 
53-11-123. 
53-11-124. 
Licensure — Qualification 
credit for specified training 
License fees — Deposit m 
General Fund 
Issuance of license and card to 
applicant — License period 
— Expiration of application 
— Transfer of license pro-
hibited. 
Identification cards 
Workers' compensation re-
quirements for employees' 
licensure. 
Grounds for denial of license 
— Appeal. 
Grounds for disciplinary ac-
tion. 
Requirement to identify em-
ploying agency. 
False representation as a lic-
ensee 
Requirements during search 
and seizure — Notification 
of law enforcement agency 
Notification of local law en-
forcement. 
Penalties. 
53-11-101. Title, 
Tliis cnapter is known as the "bmlBorl^iecover^Act. , ' 
History: C. 1953,53-10-101, enacted by L. 
998, ch. 257, § 1; recompiled as 53-11-101. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 257 
became effective on May 4, 1998, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ADDENDUM C 
25 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-304 
The mere existence of a personal relationship 
does not establish entrapment. Entrapment 
requires some exploitation of the personal rela-
tionship. State v. Martinez, 848 R2d 702 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 R2d 585 (Utah 
1993). 
Although the state, through an undercover 
officer, exploited a close personal relationship 
with defendant, there was no nexus between 
the personal relationship and defendant's offer 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — If the 
Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who is the 
Next Target? — An Examination of the Entrap-
ment Theory, 19 J. Contemp. L. 217 (1993). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§ 244 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 58. 
A.L.R. — Larceny: entrapment or consent, 
10 A.L.R.3d 1121. 
False arrest or imprisonment: entrapment as 
precluding justification of arrest or imprison-
ment, 15 A.L.R.3d 963. 
Defense of entrapment in contempt proceed-
ings, 41 A.L.R.3d 418. 
Admissibility of evidence of other offenses in 
rebuttal of defense of entrapment, 61 A.L.R.3d 
293. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-304, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-304; 1974, ch. 32, § 5. 
of cocaine. State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 R2d 1356 
(Utah 1993). 
There was no nexus between parties' per-
sonal relationship and defendant's actions in 
approaching undercover officer and inquiring 
whether she could help him procure a pound of 
marijuana. State v. Keitz, 856 R2d 685 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
Entrapment as a defense in proceedings to 
revoke or suspend license to practice law or 
medicine, 61 A.L.R.3d 357. 
Modern status of the law concerning entrap-
ment to commit narcotics offense — state cases, 
62 A.L.R.3d 110. 
Burden of proof as to entrapment defense — 
state cases, 52 A.L.R.4th 775. 
Entrapment as defense to charge of selling or 
supplying narcotics where government agents 
supplied narcotics to defendant and purchased 
them from him, 9 A.L.R.5th 464. 
Right of criminal defendant to raise entrap-
ment defense based on having dealt with other 
party who was entrapped, 15 A.L.R,5th 39. 
Actions by state official involving defendant 
as constituting "outrageous" conduct violating 
due process guaranties, 18 A.L.R.5th 1. 
76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves 
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law 
is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his 
conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable 
reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or 
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a 
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a 
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser 
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he 
believed. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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